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We are beings of the flesh. We experience our world and our selves primar-
ily through our bodily spatial and temporal orientations, through our physi-
cal movements, through our perceptions, and through our culturally-embedded
projects. In light of the tremendous importance of such bodily interactions for
our ability to survive and flourish within our environment, it should come as
no surprise that what can be meaningful to us, how we reason about it, and
how we communicate our understanding of this experience are intimately tied
up with our bodily being.
We are the inheritors of an Enlightenment tradition whose mind-body dualism
and whose conception of the self, concepts,
reason, and knowledge have led us to overlook the non-dualistic, embodied di-
mensions of our experience. As one logical extension of this tradition, con-
temporary cognitive science has either ignored or undervalued the role of our
bodily experience in our cognition, language, reasoning, and self-identity. For
materialists and anti-materialists alike, human subjectivity comes to be defined
with virtually no attention to the richness of our incarnate experience. Anti-
materialists tend to downplay the role of the body, as secondary to the activity
of mind. Materialists tend to discuss only the neural networks of the brain, leav-
ing aside any mention of our embodied experience. In both cases, human beings
come to be defined as knowers (and thus as minds), and what they know are
propositions and their relations. A human subject becomes merely a generator
and processor of propositions and propositional functions.
The results of this narrowing and dichotomizing of the self have been widespread
and extremely harmful. Within the context of a rigid subject-object dichoto-
my, selfhood is understood either as mind (subjectivity), or as body (objective
physical states). Objectivist and materialist versions tend almost universally to
ignore the temporal, bodily, and cultural dimensions of our selfhood, while sub-
jectivist versions forget that, because our intelligence is embodied, there exist
some soft constraints on meaning, knowledge, and self-understanding.
As a way of beginning to counteract both dualistic and reductionistic tendencies
alike, I want to explore concrete examples of some of the ways our concepts
and our ability to reason about them are grounded in our bodily experience,
though not in such a way as to give absolute foundations. Out of these examples
there emerge suggestions for a far more experientially adequate view of meaning,
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reason, and self — identity. Meaning and reason are both grounded in our bodily
experience, and yet they are imaginative, and so open to ongoing extension and
novel development. The self is not a thing, but rather an integrating process
that characterizes and gives a degree of continuity to a sequence of temporally
developing, related experiences. Thus the continuity of the self is the unity of a
meaning-making activity that shows itself in our language, behavior, symbolic
activities, and cultural activities.
There is a large and growing body of empirical evidence that supports such
a non-reductionistic view. In particular, I want to focus on studies of image
schemas and other imaginative structures of experience that are basic to the
structure of our conceptual systems and to the way we reason. But linguistic
and psychological studies are not the only supports for this view. I have recently
been exploring how our Enlightenment legacy concerning concepts, reason, and
the self has left us with impoverished views of morality. And I would like to
suggest what an alternative view of moral reasoning would involve — one in
which imagination is given a central role as the locus of our moral deliberations.
On this view, morality is not rule — following, but rather the imaginative
exploration of possibilities for enhancing the quality of experience, preserving
and developing community, and discovering alternative ways of relating to each
other and to our environment.
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